Publications
(2023). Bad Reputation with Simple Rating Systems. Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 150-178.
Review management mitigates the negative effects of reputational concerns in reputation systems.
(2023). Dynamic Information Design under Constrained Communication Rules. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(1), 359-98.
How to persuade agents when communication constraints limit the belief spread?
Ongoing Projects
(2024). Information Acquisition in Deliberative Democracies. [under review]
With costly political learning, deliberative democracies may lead to less informed collective decisions.
(2024). Multilateral Bargaining with Information Spillovers. [work in progress]
Correlated demands rationalize more dynamic pricing than what classic bargaining models suggest.
(2023). Political Accountability and Misinformation. [work in progress]
What are the impacts of misinformation on political accountability?
(2022). Persuading Crowds. [working paper]
I examine crowd manipulation through dynamic info design, and show when to induce herd behavior.